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Abstract  
 
The article examines how growth fluctuations in major trading partner countries of the world 
have affected the Indian economy since its liberalization from the mid 1990s. This empirical 
study confirms that domestic output of India was strongly influenced by global shocks. The 
findings are not surprising as India’s trade and financial integration with the rest of the world 
has been on the rise.  
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 1. Introduction 
 
The financial and banking crises originating in the United States (US) in late 2007, which 
later spread to other advanced countries in Europe in the next two years, eventually affected 
developing countries as well in varying degrees. Consequently, the subject of macroeconomic 
interdependence of developing countries including India in a globalised world has been 
receiving wide attention. The paper seeks to investigate how far growth fluctuations in major 
countries of the world with which India has developed trade and financial relations since its 
economic liberalisation from the mid 1990s have been impacting the country.  
 
This article, which employs a variable autoregression (VAR) modeling procedure for 
estimating the degree of impact of economic activities of selected major countries on India, is 
organised as follows:  the next section provides a brief background by tracing the progress in 
India’s trade and financial relations with the rest of the world; the third section outlines the 
methodology adopted and presents the empirical results; and the fourth and last section 
presents conclusions with policy implications.  
 
2. Background 
 
Economic growth in developed and developing countries, as reflected in the annual growth 
rates since the beginning of 2000 has been remarkable (Table 1).  The devastating effects of 
the Asian financial crisis of 1997 were quickly overcome and the emerging economies led by 
China were marching towards growth and prosperity, which was well supported by rise in 
trade volumes and flow of funds between nations. Soon after the failure of some of the 
leading banking and financial institutions in the US and UK in 2007, the recessionary effects 
began to be felt across the continents commencing from early 2008 (Ram Mohan 2009).  
 
However, there was some initial optimism, which was based on the ‘decoupling’ theory that 
emerging economies would be spared of the adverse impact of the crisis. It was argued that 
that even if the developed countries would experience a decline in economic activities as a 
fallout of the financial crisis, it would be a shallow crisis; and that emerging economies 
including India, because of their better financial regulations and control over financial sector 
institutions with much less exposure to the sub-prime mortgage assets of the failed 
institutions, and because of larger foreign exchange holdings as well, would be spared of the 
impact. Further, it was held that India’s growth was mainly domestic demand driven and its 
exports were increasingly directed to other economies and there was declining reliance on US 
(Boorman 2009; Boorman et al.  2010).  
 
There were strong reasons for such optimism. These were: (i) the American financial crisis 
was country specific, which was considered only a correction in the housing sector rather 
than due to generalised  factor such as oil shock; (ii) trade linkages of emerging economies 
with the US were diminishing, but trade was rising among emerging markets; (iii) growth in 
emerging markets was more domestic demand driven; (iv) emerging economies were net 
savers, not borrowers; and (v) emerging economies had effected several economic reforms 
which introduced greater stability (Ram Mohan 2009,  IMF 2007). However, as the crisis 
became one of severe slow-down rather than mild slow-down, due to asset price activation 
and gradually declining financial flows to emerging markets, the “de-coupling” theory did 
not appear to hold water (Ram Mohan 2009).   
 
 
 Table 1. Growth Rates of the World and Selected Advanced and Developing Countries 
(Percent) 
 1995-99 
(Average) 
2000-04 
(Average) 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
2010 
(estimate) 
World 3.5 3.5 4.4 4.9 4.8 2.5 -2.2 5.0 
Adv.Economies 3.1 2.4 2.6 3.0 2.7 0.4 -3.3 3.0 
Eurozone NA  1.9 1.8 3.1 2.8 0.4 -4.1 -1.8 
UK 3.3 2.8 2.2 2.9 2.6 0.5 -4.9 1.7 
US 4.0 2.6 3.1 2.7 2.1 0.4 -2.6 2.8 
Germany 1.7 1.1 0.9 3.4 2.6 1.0 -4.7 3.6 
Singapore 6.1 5.0 7.6 8.7 8.2 1.4 -2.0             3.6 
Japan 0.8 1.5 1.9 2.0 2.3 -1.2 -5.3 4.3 
China  9.1 9.2 10.4 11.7 13.0 9.0 9.2 10.3 
UAE 3.9 7.7 8.2 8.7 6.1 5.1 -2.6 2.4 
Brazil 2.0 3.0 3.2 4.0 6.1 5.1 -0.2 7.5 
India 6.5 6.0 9.5 9.7 9.2 6.7 7.4 9.7 
Source: Author's calculations; ADB (2010), IMF (2010) 
 
Observing that subsequent developments proved the optimistic expectations of mild slow-
down were wrong, the Reserve Bank of India Governor Subbarao (2008) confirmed in a 
policy speech that there had been steady contractions with slumping demand, declining 
production and rise in unemployment in developed countries, which resulted in fall in trade 
and financial integration between developed and developing countries. Thus, the US financial 
crisis spread to the real sector not only in America but also in Europe and in emerging 
countries (Goldstein and Xie 2009). There have been events of capital flow reversals, sharp 
widening of spreads on sovereign and corporate debt and abrupt currency depreciations. 
Governor Subbarao (2008) confirmed that “in a globalized world no country can be an 
island”. In a subsequent speech, Governor Subbarao (2009a) noted that transmission channels 
of severe impact on India were through trade, financial and confidence channels, making it 
clear that globalisation is a double edged sword.  
 
India’s trade relations 
 
Over the last 50 years, world trade as a ratio of GDP more than doubled from 24 per cent in 
1960 to 57 per cent in 2006, just before the financial crisis hit the world. Economic 
liberalization began in India in the mid 1990s as the country opened the economy to foreign 
and domestic competition in a number of directions. These included international trade, 
telecommunication and privatisation (Panagaria 2008) and progressive financial market 
integration from the late 1990s (Dua et al. 2004).  India's integration into the world economy 
over the last decade has been remarkably rapid (Subbarao 2008, 2009b). Table 2, which 
shows the directions of trade over a two decade period, indicates that besides the steady trade 
with traditional partners, there were new partners of trade as well: China in Asia and 
countries in the Middle East and Southeast Asia.  
 
Going by the common measure of globalisation, India's two-way trade (merchandise exports 
plus imports), as a proportion of GDP, grew from an average 21 percent during a five-year 
period (1995-99) to reach the maximum of 38 percent in 2008 (Table 3). 
 
 
 
 Table 2. India's Trade in Commodities with Major Trading Partners: Shares of Total 
trade (in percent) 
 1990-
1999 
(Average) 
2000-
2004 
(Average) 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
United States 12.3 12.4 10.6 10.0 10.0 8.7 9.3 
UAE 3.9 4.2 5.3 6.3 6.9 8.9 8.4 
China 1.2 4.1 6.9 8.0 9.0 8.7 9.0 
Singapore 2.3 3.0 3.5 3.7 3.7 3.4 3.7 
United 
Kingdom 1.0 1.3 2.1 2.0 1.8 1.7 1.2 
Hong Kong, 
China 2.1 2.3 1.8 1.6 1.5 1.4 1.5 
Germany 3.4 2.1 2.3 2.4 2.4 2.4 3.0 
Netherlands 0.9 0.9 0.9 0.9 1.2 1.3 0.9 
Belgium 0.5 1.4 1.2 1.1 1.0 1.0 0.8 
Italy 2.7 8.8 6.9 6.2 5.2 4.5 4.9 
Euro area 12.5 13.1 11.4 10.6 9.8 9.2 9.6 
Source: Author's calculations; ADB (2010), IMF (2010) 
 
 
Table 3. India's Trade, Capital and Financial Relations with Rest of the World 
 
1995-1999 
(Ave.) 
2000-
2004 
(Ave.) 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Exports (mill US$) 34,793 59,084 105,152 128,888 166,162 189,001 182,163 
Imports (mill US$) 49,346 75,513 157,056 190,670 257,629 307,651 299,491 
Total trade in Goods 
(mill US$) 84,139 134,597 262,208 319,558 423,792 496,653 481,654 
Total trade in 
Goods/GDP (%) 20.5 23.9 31.2 33.8 35.4 38.8 37.4 
Current Account 
Transfers (mill US$) 11,517 18,891 26,553 32,861 46,577 50,296 56,750 
Current Account 
Transfers/GDP (%) 28.0 34.2 31.6 34.8 38.9 39.3 44.1 
Capital Account 
Transactions /GDP 21.7 25.1 30.3 47.8 89.1 5.7 41.6 
FDI (mill US$) 2,639 3,465 3,034 7,693 15,893 17,498 19,729 
FDI/ GDP (%) 6.4 6.5 3.6 8.1 13.3 13.7 15.3 
Port folio inv (mill 
US$) 2,201 4,745 12,494 7,060 27,433.197 140,030 32,396 
Portfolio inv/GDP 
(%) 5.4 8.0 14.9 7.5 22.9 109.3 25.2 
Services  (mill US$) 26,240 54,529 110,819 144,038 175,442 186,849 186,823 
Services and 
Incomes /GDP (%) 63.3 96.9 131.9 152.3 146.6 145.8 145.1 
Total capital & Fin 
Transactions / GDP 
(% ) 96.8 136.5 180.6 215.7 271.9 274.4 227.3 
Source: Author's calculations; ADB (2010), IMF (2010) 
 
 
 Globalisation of finance has been of much greater intensity. The ratio of total foreign assets 
and foreign liabilities to GDP rose from 45 per cent in 1970 to over 350 percent in 2006.  
Intensity of India's financial integration with the world has also been growing over the period. 
The ratio of total external transactions to GDP, which is an expanded measure denoting this 
ratio has more than doubled from average 97 percent during 1995-99 to 227 percent in 2008. 
 
Remittances 
 
The impact of globalisation on labour, which is reflected in the growing mobility of people 
over the last two decades, seeking jobs outside their countries of origin is more striking. Asia 
added nearly three billion to the world’s pool of labour as it integrated with the rest of the 
world over the last two decades. As a result, inflows of remittances to all developing 
countries rose.  India received the highest amount of remittances in absolute terms ($49.3 
billion) in 2009, which is about 3.8 percent of GDP, ranking at world number four (Table 4). 
 
Table 4.  Top Ten Remittance Recipients of 2009 
Country 
Remittances 
Percentage of 
GDP US$ (billions) 
Philippines  12.3   19.8  
Bangladesh  11.8   10.5  
Nigeria  5.8   9.6  
India  3.8   49.3  
Mexico  2.5   22.2  
Belgium  2.2   10.4  
China  1.0   47.6  
Spain  0.7   9.9  
France  0.6   15.6  
Germany  0.3   10.9  
Source: World Bank (2010) 
 
Table 5 presents the trend in India’s remittance inflows, which are of sizeable support to the 
country’s foreign reserves. Thus, we have been witnessing a three dimensional expansion of 
globalisation: trade, finance and labour. With the rapid integration of India’s economy with 
global economy, economic fluctuations in the major countries of the world, with which India 
has developed deeper trade and financial relations during the last two decades, are bound to 
affect India's national output. The next section deals with empirical aspects of investigation 
and to what extent growth fluctuations in the world affected India's growth, influencing the 
macroeconomic interdependence of global economy.    
 
3. Methodology, Modeling and Results  
 
 Nature of Shocks 
 
Global macroeconomic interdependence is signified by transmission of shocks from one 
economy to another. These shocks, which affect aggregate supply and demand sides of a 
given economy, may be either internal or external. Domestic supply shocks are of two kinds: 
positive and negative. Positive domestic supply shocks, which boost supply, stem from policy 
reforms and institutional improvements aiming at better governance, thereby increasing 
 productivity.  On the other hand, negative supply shocks dent supply. The usual external 
negative shocks for economies in South Asia include a rise in oil price or fall in terms of 
trade. Domestic negative supply shocks arise from natural disasters, such as floods and 
cyclones or man-made disasters, including social unrest.   
 
Table 5. India's Inward Remittances 
Year US $ (Billion) Percent of GDP 
1971-1980 (Average) 0.75 0.57 
1981-1990 (Average) 2.46 1.02 
1991-2000 (Average) 7.44 1.96 
2001 14.27 2.99 
2002 15.74 3.10 
2003 21.00 3.50 
2004 18.75 2.60 
2005 22.13 2.64 
2006 28.33 2.99 
2007 37.22 3.02 
2008 49.94 4.11 
2009 49.26 3.76 
Source: World Bank (2010). 
 
 
Demand shocks are also of two kinds. Positive ones are those stepping up aggregate demand, 
including the rise in private sector activities or fiscal stimulus during periods of depressed 
domestic demand. Negative demand shocks, which reduce aggregate demand usually 
emanate from fall in investor confidence that decreases capital formation. These shocks 
might originate either within a country or outside the country.  
 
Our study seeking to investigate impacts of rising global interdependence on India, since its 
liberalization from the early nineties, adopts a vector autoregression (VAR) modeling 
methodology, which has been utilized by notable studies, including Kawai and Motonishi 
(2005) and Takagi (2008). The study specifically focuses on examining how shocks from one 
particular country to another are transmitted each quarter. However, the choice of period of 
study and of variables for econometric modeling to study the impact of shocks on India is 
dictated by the number of quarterly observations available. First, the national income data 
series for India on a quarterly basis are available only from 1996 onwards.  Secondly, as the 
degrees of freedom for econometric analysis are affected by the limited number of 
observations as well as the number of lags employed, we have to restrict the number of 
countries as well.  While the US (being the largest economy) and the Eurozone (the third  
largest economic entity)  automatically choose themselves as the candidate countries, we also 
choose UK for its historical importance to India as the traditional major trade and investment 
partner.  
 
While USA, UK and Eurozone thus represent the West, Singapore represents ASEAN 
countries. For the middle-east region, we chose UAE. Thus, we have in all six countries 
including India. All countries except UAE have time series of quarterly real GDP, while UAE 
reports data only on annual basis. Hence, we are constrained to use cubic-spline procedure to 
generate quarterly data for UAE. As the quarterly RGDP data series for the Eurozone are 
compiled from 1999, which marks the birth of the single currency, the period of analysis has 
to be restricted to 1998Q4-2010Q1. The total number of quarterly observations is 46. All real 
 output data series, which are expressed in respective local currency units, are first converted 
into index numbers, so as to eliminate the influences of exchange rate fluctuations and then 
transformed into respective logs before entering them into analysis. 
  
 
 The Model 
 
The VAR model comprises six variables and the moving average representations are given 
below: 
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where   
USA
   
= RGDP of USA;  
EURO = RGDP of Eurozone;  
UK = RGDP of United Kingdom 
UAE= RGDP of UAE 
SGP= RGDP of Singapore 
IND= RGDP of India 
 
As noted by Takagi (2008), the estimation of a VAR system is sensitive to the choice of 
particular strategy such as the ordering of the variables and lag length. We assume that 
initially, in the first round a shock to output of USA affects the outputs of UK, Eurozone, and 
India; a shock to USA’s output affects the outputs of UK, Eurozone, Singapore, UAE, and 
India; a shock to the output of UK affects the outputs of Eurozone, Singapore, UAE, and 
India; a shock to the output of Singapore affects the outputs of UAE and India; and a shock to 
the output of UAE affects the output of India, whereas the output of India affects none. 
Accordingly, we enter the variables in that order, namely: USA, UK, EURO, SGP, UAE and 
IND.  We employ the Akaike information criterion for determining the lag length. 
 
Variance decomposition 
 
We adopt the approach of variance decomposition, which determines how much of the total 
variance in India’s output is explained by the variability in the outputs of USA, UK, 
 Eurozone, Singapore and UAE. Specifically, it enables us to conclude about the proportion of 
changes in a variable resulting from its own shocks as well as shocks to other variables in the 
system (Enders 1995: 311). For instance, if shocks or innovations to outputs of USA, UK, 
Euro area, Singapore and UAE explain none of the forecast error variance of India at all 
periods in the time horizon, it would mean economic growth of India might have evolved 
independently of the global shocks.  
 
4. Results and interpretations 
 
Unit root tests  
 
We used two testing procedures for examining the order of integration of each series, namely 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) and Ng and Perron (2001) unit root tests. The results by 
both tests indicate that the time series are non-stationary in levels (Table 6). After first 
differencing, however, unit root tests reveal that the series are of I(1).  
 
Table 6. Results of Unit Root Tests 
Output  
Variable  
ADF  Ng and Perron 
Level First 
Difference 
Level First 
Difference 
EURO -2.931 -3.948** -11.131 -89.581** 
IND -1.968 -2.597* -4.737 -10.361** 
SIN  -2.730 -2.781* -2.779 -8.563** 
UAE -1.622 -3.438** -0.532 -7.573* 
UK 0.658 -3.186** -3.337 -11.339** 
USA -1.927 -3.189** -14.615 -17.281** 
Notes: The ADF critical values are based on Mckinnon. The optimal lag is chosen on the basis of Akaike 
Information Criterion (AIC). The null hypothesis for both ADF and Ng-Perron tests is a series has a unit 
root (non-stationary) while the null hypothesis of the KPSS test is it does not have unit root problem and it 
is stationary. The asterisk ** denotes the rejection of the null hypothesis at the 5% level of significance.  
 
Cointegration analysis 
 
Given the variables are all of I(1), the next stage is to examine for the presence of 
cointegration. In this analysis, we use the Johansen and Juselius (1990) procedure of 
examining the existence of cointegration. Results of the cointegration procedure, using an 
optimal lag structure for the VAR, are reported in Table 7 for these six countries. The 
maximum eigenvalue statistics suggest that there are two cointegrating vectors while the trace 
statistics show that there appear three cointegrating vectors for these countries. These results 
suggest that there is a common long-term trend which binds together all six countries.  
 
Granger causality analysis 
  
Having established the existence of a cointegrating relationship between all the six variables, 
we proceed to undertake a vector error correction modeling (VECM) in first differences for 
variance decomposition analysis. The VECM also enables us to conduct Granger causality 
tests for determining the short-and long- run temporal causality relationship between output 
of India and outputs of other economies.  Results of the Granger causality tests for output of 
India are shown in Table 8. The error correction term (ECT), which is statistically significant 
in the equation with India’s output as dependent variable re-confirms the existence of long 
 run relationship between outputs of the six countries studied. The results thus show that 
fluctuations in economic performance in the rest of the world did affect India in the long run. 
 
 
Table 7. Cointegration Tests for Multiple Cointegrating Vectors 
Null 
hypothesis  
Alternative 
hypothesis  Trace 
Statistic 
Critical 
Value 
Maximum 
Eigenvalue 
Statistic 
Critical 
Value 
 
r=0 r>0 156.410** 95.754 57.256** 40.078 
r≤1 r>1 99.154** 69.819 46.480** 33.877 
r≤2 r>2 52.674** 47.856 22.907 27.584 
r≤3 r>3 29.766 29.797 16.346 21.132 
r≤4 r>4 13.421 15.495 12.333 14.265 
r≤5 r>5 1.087 3.841 1.087 3.841 
Notes:  
** Significance at the 5% level. 
 
 
In the short run, the coefficient of Singapore output which is a proxy for ASEAN output is 
not statistically significant. However, the coefficients of all other countries are statistically 
significant indicating that fluctuations in the outputs of USA, UK, Eurozone and UAE did 
affect India’s output in the short-run as well. 
 
Table 8. Causality Results for India based on Vector Error Correction Model  
Dependent 
Variable 
F-statistics ECT 
(t-stat) ∆USA ∆UK ∆EURO ∆UAE ∆SIN  ∆IND 
∆IND 
18.511*** 34.598*** 2.350* 17.001*** 2.155 - -0.740*** 
(-7.493) 
* Significance at the 10% level. 
*** Significance at the 1% level. 
 
Variance decomposition analysis  
 
Variance decomposition analysis is based on Cholesky factorization with the following 
ordering, namely: USA, UK, EURO, UAE, SGP and IND, as noted earlier. The analysis is 
done up to 10-year horizon.  
 
India’s output is affected by shocks to outputs of countries under study in the short run, 
except Singapore. For example, shocks to outputs of USA and UK explain about 30% of 
variability in India’s output at the end of the first year, while output shocks of Eurozone and 
UAE explains about 10% of the total variation in India’s output. Although both USA and UK 
are dominant economies in explaining the variability in India’s output in the short-run, their 
effects are decreasing over the medium- and long-term. In contrast, both Eurozone and UAE 
are explaining a much higher proportion of variability in India’s output in the medium- and 
long-terms. Variability in Singapore’s output explains less than 10% of total variation in 
India’s output for the whole time horizon.  
 
 
 
 Table 9. Results of Variance Decomposition Analysis for India  
Period S.E. USA UK EURO UAE SGP IND 
1 0.012 29.520 32.008 11.527 10.587 7.125 9.231 
2 0.023 21.952 30.233 13.456 23.845 5.014 5.500 
3 0.037 16.561 36.289 12.780 28.936 3.159 2.276 
4 0.047 14.303 36.763 15.025 30.142 2.378 1.389 
5 0.055 13.560 35.107 18.143 29.940 2.119 1.131 
6 0.062 14.081 31.765 20.844 30.104 2.071 1.134 
7 0.070 14.622 27.210 24.032 31.047 2.171 0.917 
8 0.079 14.436 22.228 27.382 32.459 2.148 1.347 
9 0.090 13.269 17.331 30.638 32.374 1.844 4.545 
10 0.104 11.451 12.997 33.606 30.439 1.448 10.059 
 
 
5. Conclusions and Policy Recommendations 
 
The article examined the impact of global economic fluctuations on India, whose trade and 
financial integration with rest of the world has been growing ever since Indian economy was 
liberalised with reforms in several sectors since the mid 1990s. Using the VAR methodology, 
the empirical study finds that in the long run shocks to the five countries chosen for 
investigation significantly impacted India’s output. The results are not surprising given that 
there is strong evidence India seems to be well integrated regionally and globally in both 
trade and finance with these countries.  
 
The policy implication is that since there is every likelihood of the intensity of trade and 
financial integration growing stronger in the near future, it would be appropriate that India 
and its partners should strive towards achieving a high degree of synchronisation of their  
monetary and exchange rate policies, which would eventually minimise volatility in growth 
rates.  
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